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Abstract
The aim of this article is to return to Antonio Gramsci’s highly original contributions in the Prison
Notebooks concerning questions of organization and especially his conceptualization of the Modern
Prince. In particular, I want to stress the importance of a certain conception of the intellectuality of
politics that emerges in the Prison Notebooks, and which I consider to be one of Gramsci’s more original
contributions. Since Gramsci’s texts were written against the background of the various debates around
the “organization question” in the history of the working class movement, the article begins by revisiting
some the answers offered to this question, in order to stress that the question of a certain intellectuality
of politics from the beginning has been central to these debates. Then, I move forward to Gramsci’s own
intervention, in an attempt to show how a conception of organization as a laboratory of political
intellectuality and experimentation emerges and how it is linked to the entire conceptual framework of
Gramsci’s work-in-progress. Finally, I attempt to show how all these are relevant to contemporary debates
regarding radical left political parties and fronts.
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The Modern Prince as a Laboratory of Political
Intellectuality
Panagiotis Sotiris
Introduction1
In the history of the working-class movements, the question of
organization, its form and functioning returns constantly.2 The very
notions of organization and the party have been debated
extensively and intensively and constitute one of the most
contested terrains within Marxism, both politically and theoretically.
One of the most important contributions has been Antonio
Gramsci’s conceptualization of the Modern Prince in the Prison
Notebooks, and in particular what can be described as his conception
of organization as a laboratory of political intellectuality. In
particular, I think that the very notion of political intellectuality
(combined with a certain experimental conception towards which
the analogy of the laboratory points) is at the centre of any attempt
to actually think the question of organization and its strategic
articulation with any hegemonic practice aiming at transformation
and emancipation. The questions referring to organization and its
role in the transformation of modes of thinking, in the
confrontation with antagonistic ideologies, in the articulation of
learning practices (including treating politics as an experimental
configuration) in the production of knowledges, in the elaboration
of strategies, in the enabling of the gnoseological, theoretical and
cultural aspects of any potential subaltern hegemony, have been at
the centre of debates around the question of organization and this
is what makes Gramsci’s intervention so important. To bring this
forward, it is necessary to revisit some of the debates around the
question of organization and political intellectuality in the Marxist
tradition, before moving to Gramsci’s elaborations in the Prison
Notebooks and then attempting an assessment of Gramsci’s
contribution in the light of contemporary debates around questions
of organization.
The writer wishes to thank the anonymous referees and Derek Boothman for their invaluable
comments on earlier versions of this text.
2 On recent debates see Thomas 2013.
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1. The question of organization and political intellectuality in the history of
Marxism
1.1. Marx: organization as aporia
Marx’s work does not offer a systematic reflection on the
question of organization. Although Marx and Engels borrow the
notion of the party from the political vocabulary of their era, texts
such as the Communist Manifesto do not actually offer a theory for a
working-class party. Rather, they presented communists as the most
radical wing of the working-class organizations of that time.
The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other workingclass parties. [...]
The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most
advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country,
that section which pushes forward all others. (MECW, vol. 6, p. 497).

Even the “Address of the Central Authority of the League” to its
members, written in March 1850, which insisted that the class
interests of the proletariat demanded “an independent party as soon
as possible” which will not be “misled for a single moment by the
hypocritical phrases of the democratic petty bourgeois” and whose
“battle cry must be: The Revolution in Permanence” (MECW, vol.
10, 287) does not make more concrete proposals upon how this
“independent political party of the proletariat” should be organised.
We should take into consideration the fact that the working-class
movements and the revolutionary tendencies of that time
represented a galaxy of different and fragmented collective forms
that included journals, small groups of intellectuals and workers,
utopian experiments, small organizations, and personal circles.
Even the International Working Men’s Association, was less an
“International” and more a network that brought together
organizations, representatives of trade unions and important
personalities, from a very broad spectrum of ideological currents,
most of them at that time more influential than the positions of
Marx and Engels. As Monty Johnstone has suggested these
included:
(a) the small international Communist cadres’ organization (the League of
Communists – 1847-52); (b) the ‘party’ without an organization (during the ebb
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of the labour movement – 1850s and early ’60s); (c) the broad international
federation of workers’ organizations (the First International – 1864-72); (d) the
Marxist national mass party (German Social Democracy – 1870s, ’80s and early
’90s); (e) the broad national labour party (Britain and America—1880s and
early ’90s) based on the Chartist model. (Johnstone 1967, p. 122).

Moreover, both Marx and Engels found themselves in the
middle of a tension between two important currents of their time.
On the one hand, there was the current of State Socialism
represented by Lassalle, the current which at the same time was one
of the first to insist upon the need to form a national labour party,
and which was one of the constituent tendencies of German socialdemocracy. On the other hand, there was the anarchist current, in
the particular version represented by Bakunin, where anti-statism
was combined with a certain conception of the small conspiratorial
group, 3 a position that was influential in many countries. Both
currents had a massive following and this was evident in the
continuous influence of Lassalle’s line in the German working-class
movement, long after his death, and of course in the clash between
Marx and Bakunin the Hague Congress. These currents represented
positions which Marx and Engels felt obliged to struggle against
(since it was obvious that they opposed both the logic of a statecentred socialist policy and with the practice of the small
conspiratorial group) and at the same time to recognize as actually
existing currents within the working class movement. 4 It is as if
such positions represented real currents and aspects of the reality of
the working class movement. Regarding this point Étienne Balibar
made an important observation:
Let us mention only one example: the triangle formed by Marx, Lassalle,
and Bakunin. In my opinion, one does not wonder enough about the fact that
such indefatigable polemicists such as Marx and his faithful assistant Engels
turned out to be incapable of writing an “Anti-Lassalle” or an “Anti-Bakunin,”
which would have been practically much more important than an Anti-Dühring
or even than the reissue of an Anti-Proudhon. No personal and no tactical
reason in the world will ever be able to explain such a lapse, a lapse which
moreover was, as we know, heavy with political consequences. They did not write
it because they could not write it (Balibar 1994, p. 134).
A view also held by Blanquists. See Green 2017.
For a detailed account of the evolution of the other currents of the working class movement
and Marx and Engel’s confrontation with them see Draper 1990. See also Johnstone 1967.
3
4

4

International Gramsci Journal No. 10 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) Summer /Estate 2019

In this sense, we can say that the question of organization
remained an aporia for Marx and Engels in particular around the
question of the form of a proletarian party, its internal functioning
and above all the way that theory, knowledge and strategy could be
produced in an antagonistic and class autonomous way.
It was the formation of German social-democracy with the SPD
becoming the model party, in particular after the 1891 Erfurt
Congress, that gave the first example of a really mass working class
party. At the beginning of the 20th century, it was the most impressive example of a mass party in Europe. It was a party that was not
simply involved in massive campaigns of political propaganda and
organization building but also gradually created a “parallel universe”
of working class newspapers, organizations, trade unions, clubs,
mutual assistance organizations, schools, while at the same time
insisting on its role as guarantor of Marxist “orthodoxy”, even after
the appearance of the Bernstein’s “revisionist” positions.5 However,
the overall experience and evolution of German social-democracy
also made evident its limitations and its inability to initiate a
revolutionary sequence.
Moreover, although an educational role and an insistence on
mass ideological transformation was one of the main concerns,
German Social-Democracy failed to offer an answer to the
question: in what sense does the political organization produce
antagonistic and autonomous forms of political intellectuality and
strategy, by means and practices that are linked in an “organic” way
to the subaltern classes themselves and their aspirations? Thus the
question of a particular form and practice of antagonistic political
intellectuality remained open.
1.2 What is to be done? as a text of political gnoseology
Few texts in the history of Marxism have come under as much
accusation as Lenin’s What is to be done?. It is common to reject it as
On the ‘Erfurtian’ model of the mass Social-democratic party and its appeal in the
international working class movement see Lih 2008. As Broué mentions (2006, pp. 14-15) in
1914 the SPD had 1,085,905 members, in the elections held two years before it had won
4,250,000 votes, the trade unions associated with the SPD had 2 million members, it had 90
daily newspaper, employed 267 full time journalists, 3,000 workers and employees to print and
distribute them, it had 110 Reichstag deputies and 220 deputies in local parliaments, 2,886
municipal councilors and many professional cadres.
5
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a text that simply insists upon a certain – and by now parochial –
conception of a small conspiratorial group based upon the idea that
socialist consciousness has to be brought to workers from the
outside. However, this approach simply misses the importance of
this text. Lars T. Lih (2008) has stressed, in his magisterial
comparative reading of What is to be done?, the influence of German
Social-Democracy and the “Erfurtian” model upon Lenin, but I
think that this approach underestimates the originality of Lenin’s
positions. In contrast, Lucio Magri stressed that Lenin actually tried
to answer some of the open questions in Marx’s writings on
questions of organization.
However, one aspect of the theory of the proletarian party, and by no
means a secondary one, was never fully clarified by Marx. Confined to the
immediacy of prevailing conditions, the proletariat cannot achieve a complete
vision of the social system as a whole, nor promote its overthrow. Its practice
as a class can only develop by transcending this immediacy via the mediation of
revolutionary consciousness. What then is the process, the mechanism by
which this consciousness is produced? Or, to pose the question more precisely:
can this class consciousness develop within the proletariat spontaneously, by
virtue of an intrinsic necessity, based on elements that are already present in its
social objectivity and which gradually come to dominate over the other
elements that originally condemned it to a subordinate and fragmented
condition? Or must revolutionary consciousness represent a global
transcendence of the immediacy of the proletariat, produced by a qualitative
dialectical leap – a complex interaction between external forces and the
spontaneous action of the class itself? (Magri, 1970: 101).

The central issue of What is to be done? is a question of political
gnoseology in regard to the possibility of a revolutionary
consciousness as a form of consciousness that transcends the
immediacy of the everyday condition of labour and opens up
towards an understanding of the overall working of the social
system in order to rethink the possibility of a political movement
for revolutionary change. Lenin’s position is organized not only
around the acknowledgement of the influence of dominant
ideology upon the spontaneous ideology of the masses, but also
around the insistence that any attempt to enable the formation of a
revolutionary consciousness should be intensified along with the
spontaneous militancy of the masses.

6
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[T]he fundamental error committed by the “new trend” in Russian SocialDemocracy is its bowing to spontaneity and its failure to understand that the
spontaneity of the masses demands a high degree of consciousness from us
Social-Democrats. The greater the spontaneous upsurge of the masses and the
more widespread the movement, the more rapid, incomparably so, the demand
for greater consciousness in the theoretical, political and organizational work
of Social-Democracy (LCW, vol. 5, p. 397)

So the crucial question is how to produce this particular form of
consciousness within the terrain of class struggles, but in a way that
goes beyond simply reproducing the spontaneous proletarian
ideological representations. Although Lenin insists that revolutionary consciousness is not inherent to the working class in its everyday practice, the formation of such consciousness is not external to
the terrain of social and political antagonism, but internal to class
struggle and it refers more to qualitative transformation rather than
“injection” from the outside. Moreover, it is here that the party is
treated not as the “guarantor” of revolutionary truth, but rather as
the production site for an antagonistic form of intellectuality. And
as Sylvain Lazarus has stressed it is here that we find the actual
tension between Marx and Lenin.
The tension lies rather in the fact that, for Marx, the appearance of
Communists is something internal to the existence of the workers as a class.
Lenin distances himself from this thesis by his critique of what he calls
spontaneous consciousness. Revolutionary consciousness, the appearance of
revolutionary militants, is not a spontaneous phenomenon. It is a very
particular phenomenon, and it requires a break with spontaneous forms of
consciousness. The political core of nonspontaneous consciousness is
antagonism to the entire existing social and political order. As for the
mechanism of realization of the conditions that will permit the emergence of a
political consciousness, it is the party (Lazarus, 2007: 259).

Moreover, Lazarus insists that in Marx we cannot find a theory
of political consciousness. We can find a theory of history as history
of class struggles and a theory of historical consciousness but not a
theory of political consciousness. For Lazarus it is Lenin that
inaugurates the confrontation with this question.
With Marx, in fact, there is no theory of organization, nor can we speak of a
real theory of political consciousness. There is a theory, major and fundamental, of historical consciousness and of consciousness as historical consciousness
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– the history of humanity is the history of class struggles. I hold that Lenin
brings the foundation of modern politics in the fact that revolutionary politics
is required to announce and practice the conditions of its existence (Lazarus,
2007: 259).

On his part Antonio Negri in the reading he offers of Lenin, a
reading influenced by the idiosyncratic Leninism of Italian operaismo,
stresses the link between the particular condition of the Russian
proletariat and the way the Lenin thinks the very question of
organization, suggesting that Lenin thinks the political party as a
factory of strategy.
The party, too, must be able to organize and form the multiplicative
character of revolutionary labour, exalting and subverting against capital the
very thing that it determines as a growth of the productive power of socialized
labour. The party is a factory; it is an enterprise of subversion, an ability to
impose a multiplier of productive rationality onto the revolutionary will of
militants and the spontaneity of the masses. The party turns this primary
matter, which is workers’ insubordination, into the accumulation of revolution,
into a generic power to attack the adversary (Negri, 2014: 36).

It is true that any attempt to present a unified “Leninist theory of
the party” would only lead to simplifications, anachronisms and the
reproductions of later canonizations. Most of Lenin’s texts were
interventions in the conjuncture, they answered to exigencies in
relation to very specific times and places, are over-determined by
the particular conditions and the history of the Russian workingclass movement and often deal with tactics rather than strategy.
However, we can note at least three important elements.
The first one has to do with the connection between party and
strategy. The party represents the strong connection to revolutionary strategy, not as something referring to the distant future but as
constant elaboration of the ways to connect immediate political
exigencies and the ability to develop a form of revolutionary
consciousness and practice that would enable the working class to
be the leading force of all the subaltern classes.
The second element is what we could define as class autonomy.
The demand for an independent political organization of the
working class, as expression of its class antagonistic character, runs
through the entire history of the working-class movement, ever
since the Communist Manifesto. However, it is in Lenin’s texts that we
find this demand not only as an organizational aspect (this was
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already evident in German Social-Democracy), but as a strategic
line that runs through all practices and interventions. For Lenin the
proletarian character of the party is not a question of class
composition of the membership or of the electorate but rather a
question of political strategy and strategic independence in regard
to dominant ideology.
And this brings to the third crucial element, that of the need for
a radical rupture. If class autonomy is above all a question of
political strategic orientation, then the organizational break with the
political forms of the working-class movement that represent the
influence of bourgeois politics and ideology becomes the necessary
condition of its revolutionary character. Lenin made this evident by
his insistence that this should also take a symbolic form on the eve
of the revolution by means of the choice of a new name (“communist”) and the formation of a new International
9) Party tasks:
(a) Immediate convocation of a Party congress;
(b) Alteration of the Party Programme, mainly:
(1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war;
(2) On our attitude towards the state and our demand for a “commune
state”;
(3) Amendment of our out-of-date minimum programme;
(c) Change of the Party’s name.
10) A new International (LCW, vol. 24, p. 24)

For Lenin the class character of a party has more to do with
strategy rather than sociology. The stake is to ensure that the largest
part of the working class will recognize itself in the political current
that represents the possibility of proletarian revolution. A careful
reading of Lenin’s texts immediately before and immediately after
October 1917 shows how his main concern and at the same time
the element he thinks is an expression of the “ripening of conditions”, is the extent of the influence of the Bolsheviks in the
Russian working class.
However, there is also a tension in his intervention. On the one
hand Lenin quickly incorporated the Soviets in his conception of
revolutionary politics, acknowledging that they represented a
practice of politics and a form of power that was antagonistic to the
bourgeois practice of politics. This is expressed in his conception of
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dual power, his insistence that the Soviets were going to be the
forms of the State under the dictatorship of the proletariat. We also
know that, in a manner similar to that of Marx in regard to the Paris
Commune, Lenin incorporated into his conception a form of autonomous class organization that emerged within class struggle itself
and was not initially a choice of the Bolshevik current (Shandro
2007). We also know that even after the revolution Lenin was
thinking in terms of a certain relation of autonomy between the
Soviets and the parties of currents that participated in them in the
struggle for hegemony. It would be through the experience of the
Civil War and later in the Stalinist era that the idea of the single
party system and the full identification between the proletarian
party and the supposedly proletarian State would become the
orthodoxy along with the abandonment of the Soviet model in
favour of the single-party State parliamentarism of the “People’s
democracies”.
Of course, one might say that some of Lenin’s interventions,
especially those specific to the confrontation between the
Bolsheviks and other currents, such as the particularly centralizing
conception of the Central Committee as the main decision body in
contrast to local organizations, can indeed to a bureaucratic
conception if taken out of context and applied as general rules. In
this sense, some of the more critical observations by Rosa
Luxemburg in her critique of Lenin on questions of organization
were valid and in particular her position that there were no
organizational guarantees against opportunism (Luxemburg 1961).
At the same time, although Lenin insisted on the relation between
party, theory and revolutionary consciousness as the means to turn
the organization into the production process of strategic initiatives,
the particular way that this should be accomplished and in
particular the question of the elaboration of an antagonistic political
intellectuality still remained open.
1.3 Georg Lukács: The question of organization as an intellectual question
One of the most important theoretical interventions in the
period after the Russian Revolution was Georg Lukács’s History and
Class Consciousness. And it is here that the question of political
intellectuality is posed in an explicit way in the last essay of the
book, which deals with the question of organization (“Towards a
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Methodology of the Problem of Organization”).6 For Lukács the
contradictory views that different tendencies of the working class
movement had in regard to the Russian Revolution and the
persisting influence of “Menshevik” currents provided evidence of
an ideological crisis of the proletariat and an inability to think on
the basis of its own class perspective, as a result of the divisions
running through the proletariat but also of the effects that the
capitalist division of labour had upon the consciousness of the
proletariat. If political organization can be defined as the “form of
mediation between theory and practice” (Lukács 1971, p. 299), the
crucial question is to what extent actual communist organizations
perform this mediation. Moreover, the necessary independence of
the communist parties (exemplified in the break with social
democratic parties) should not be seen as the formation of a
“General Staff” detached from the working class but a “new
relation between spontaneous action and conscious theoretical
foresight” (Lukács 1971, p. 317), which demanded the participation
of members in all aspects of organizational life, in order to bring
forward the proletarian worldview and struggle against all the
inherited influences of bourgeois “reified” consciousness. When
Lukács opposed the idea that the party “consists merely of a
hierarchy of officials isolated from the mass of ordinary members”
(Lukács 1971, p. 336), this was not only in order to avoid the
reproduction of bourgeois politics but also it was a necessary
condition for the party to perform this particular unity of theory
and practice which would represent the proletarian worldview in
the struggle for communism.
In Lukács’s analysis there are no simple organizational or
“military” metaphors of the party as leadership or “general headquarters”. Rather the party and the organization are presented as
spaces of collective thinking, practice and transformation. We can
see the same concerns in other texts by Lukács of that period
(Lukács 2014), in which he deals with two crucial questions, one
referring to tactics (the debate in the German communist
movement regarding the “Teilactionen”) and the other referring to
the party (“mass party or sect”). Lukács insists that the question
On the importance of this text and of Lukács’s thinking on questions of organization in
general see Thomas 2013.
6
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cannot be answered by means of bureaucratic centralization, but by
enhancing the full development of the consciousness of members.
That is why for Lukács ‘the question of organization reveals itself to
be an intellectual [geistig] question’ (Lukács 2014, p. 116).
It is obvious that for Lukács the question of political intellectuality
becomes one of the determining aspects of any potential revolutionary politics, and consequently of the organizational form of
any such politics, in a manner very similar to how Gramsci would
later face again the challenge of this question, and on a similar basis
with Lukács, namely the open questions and contradictions of the
period after 1917.
1.4. Can politics be thought?
Before moving into Antonio Gramsci’s writings on questions of
organization, I would like to turn to some more recent interventions. This detour (and slight anachronism) will help me show
how Gramsci’s thinking is not only pertinent to these debates, but
also offers a way out of crucial aporias regarding contemporary
interventions.
If we speak about the party of an independent expression of the
revolutionary dynamic of the working class, or about Lenin’s
conception of the party as the way to enhance the revolutionary
consciousness of the proletariat, or about the questions posed by
Lukács, it is obvious that there is a recurring question regarding the
connection between (revolutionary) politics and thinking, it is the
question whether politics can be thought.
This has been a question running through the work of Alain
Badiou. Can politics be thought? was even the title of one of Badiou’s
important interventions in the 1980s (Badiou 2018). In his reading
of Sylvain Lazarus’s Anthropology of the Name (Lazarus 2015) Badiou
suggests that it is possible to find in Lazarus’s work a distinct form
of intellectuality in regard to politics, a distinct “configuration of
intellectuality [dispositif d’ intellectualité]” (Badiou 2005, p. 27,
translation modified).
“People think” and “politics as thought”: Both Lazarus and
Badiou oppose these two theses to any classical conception of
theory in its relation to social reality and its potential transformation, including any conception of a dialectic of theory and practice.
In contrast, for Badiou “[t]hought is not a relation to the object, it is

12

International Gramsci Journal No. 10 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) Summer /Estate 2019

an internal relation of its Real” (Badiou 2005, p. 28) and the localization of a political singularity.
Politics is a thought. This statement excludes all recourse to the theory /
practice pairing. There is certainly a ‘doing’ of politics, but it is immediately the
pure and simple experience of a thought, its localization. Doing politics cannot
be distinguished from thinking politics (Badiou 2005, p. 46).

In the line of reasoning presented by Lazarus and Badiou, the
emphasis is always on the singularity of thought and the singularity
of revolutionary sequence. In a certain sense, politics and thinking,
thinking politics and doing revolutionary politics are part of the
same self-constituting process, which unites the subjective condition and the fact that people now think under the event, under
the new terrain opened by the opening of a singular revolutionary
sequence. For Badiou this is exemplified in Lazarus’s insistence that
“the possible is a category in subjectivity” and that “the prescriptive
possible is thus the content of subjectivities and practices that
presided over what has taken place” (Lazarus 2015, p. 160). For
Badiou,
[t]his clarifies why one is able to think the singularity of a thought within a
strictly prescriptive and self-constituting realm of interiority, both rationally
(through the category of the name and places of the name), and without having
to immerse it in the heterogeneity of time: what has taken place is thinkable,
both as a precarious singularity restricted by dates […] and as indifferent to
time. To think a singularity does indeed determine it, in the words of
Thucydides, in the guise of an ‘eternal acquisition’ (Badiou 2005, p. 38).

The notion of interiority is crucial in this conception of the
intellectuality of politics. For Lazarus interiority suggests that it is a
politics based in subjectivity and in relation to a singular sequence.
“Politics in interiority is a politics in subjectivity” (Lazarus 2016, p.
110). It is also a politics of singularity and of producing new ways
to do politics and new ways of organization.
Politics in interiority, in its assignment to the principle people think, produces
a politics in subjectivity. In its assignment to historicity, it is what makes it
possible to grasp the way in which politics exists, when it does exist, as relation
of a politics to its thought: this is the theory of politics’ historical mode. The category
of politics’ historical mode is what makes it possible to apprehend a politics in
the singular invention that it presents, the equally singular practices that it
deploys, its hitherto unseen forms of organization (Lazarus 2016, p. 112).
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However, how can we define this form of intellectuality
associated with new forms of politics and organization aiming at
social emancipation and transformation? Although Lazarus and
Badiou offer some lines of demarcation such as the insistence upon
the need for a politics at a distance from the State, the insistence on
the break with parliamentary logic and the fidelity to the communist
idea, yet the question of organization remains open. Moreover, one
can say that especially Badiou seems to reject any attempt to think
the question of political intellectuality as also an organizational
question.
This lack of a particular reference to the question of organization
as a space and process producing militant intellectualities, can also
be related to Badiou’s critique of what he has defined as a democratic materialism and a certain form of democracy. Bruno Bosteels
has suggested that this has to do with Badiou’s critical position
against a certain postmodern conception of radical democracy
“paradoxically anchored in the essential unfulfillment of both
subject and object as the founding poles of modernity” (Bosteels
2011, p. 252), in the sense of a radical lack at the centre of social
non-ontology. “Grounded in the inherent lack of the field of the
political, radical democracy always seeks to avoid the imminent
threat of totalitarianism that lies at the core of democracy itself”
(Bosteels 2011, p. 261). In contrast to this, according to Bosteels
Badiou aims to “to think the actuality of the present and to historicize the processes of subjectivization” (Bosteels 2011, p. 261), by
means of a politics based upon the communist hypothesis.
However, by delinking the question of the fidelity to the
communist hypothesis from any considerations regarding questions
of organization, political experimentation and revolutionary practice, Badiou in the end oscillates between a militant decisionism and
an almost Platonic dogmatism. This is one of the limits of his
conceptualization of politics.
In contrast, Jacques Rancière “bends the stick to the other side”
in his egalitarian conception of the intelligence of everybody as a
prerequisite of emancipation:
Instead it is the intelligence that does not fit any specific position in a social
order but belongs to anybody as the intelligence of anybody. Emancipation
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then means: the appropriation of this intelligence which is one, and the
verification of the potential of the equality of intelligence (Rancière 2010, p.
168).

For Rancière the answer to this is a communism of the
intelligence:
Emancipation means the communism of intelligence, enacted in the
demonstration of the capacity of the ‘incapable’: the capacity of the ignorant to
learn by himself, says Jacotot. We can add: the capacity of the worker to let his
eyes and his mind escape from the work of his hands, the capacity of a
community of workers to stop work even though it does not wait and even
though they need it for their livelihoods, to transform the private space of the
workshop into a public space, to organize production by their own forces or to
take on the task of governing a city that its rulers have deserted or betrayed
(Rancière 2010, p. 168).

This is a fascinating position and in a certain sense it has the
extra advantage in comparison to Badiou’s position that it does not
limit thinking to the conjuncture of a potentially revolutionary
sequence. However, there are some open questions. Although
Rancière stresses the political and intellectual potential of the
subaltern social groups, he underestimates the need for any antagonistic political intellectuality, both as theory/knowledge and
strategy, to be produced, elaborated, articulated and not just taken
give. Although a useful reminder that the subaltern can actually
think, in contrast to any doctrinaire and elitist conception of
politics, this position refuses to see the importance of the organizational forms and political practices that enhance this “communism of intelligence’” and turn into into a political strategy and
emancipatory process.
Moreover, there is another important point. It is not only that
the people think. The State also thinks, in the sense of producing
discourses, knowledges and subjectivities. Although this is a
position we tend to attribute to Foucault and his conception of the
State producing discourses and truth regimes, I would like to turn
our attention to Poulantzas and how he encapsulated this question
in State Power and Socialism
This presupposes that, in the various codes of thinking, the state itself is
overcoded: that it serves as the frame of reference within which the various
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segments of reasoning and their supporting apparatuses find homogenous
ground for their differential functioning. Through a process of measured
distillation, this overcoding is inculcated in the totality of subjects. Thus, the
capitalist State installs a uniform national language and eliminated all other
languages. [...] It is therefore the mission of the national State to organize the
process of thought by forging the materiality of the people-nation, and to
create a language which while doubtless situated within ideological formations,
is by no means reducible to an ideological operation. (Poulantzas 2000, p. 58).

So the question is how we counter this collective and materialized knowledge and intelligence, this over-coding produced by the
State. And the question becomes even more important if we
consider the fact that the people or the subaltern are neither outside
the State nor immune to its ideological and intellectual functioning
(something also underestimated by the way Rancière takes this
communism of intelligence as given). What are the collective
practices and forms, what are the forms of organization that can
actually help people think politics and think a politics of emancipation and can induce the emergence of forms of intellectuality that
maintain and expand the constitutive interiority to the possibility of
a revolutionary sequence? It is obvious that these are open
questions in the entire history of the working-class movements and
their political forms. To try and answer these questions we must
turn to Antonio Gramsci.
2. Gramsci and the challenge of mass political intellectuality
2.1 Gramsci’s confrontation with questions of organization
Gramsci’s thinking on questions of organization cannot be
separated from his conceptualization of the integral State and his
theory of hegemony, and is part of his broader confrontation with
the question of how to rearticulate a revolutionary strategy in a
period of defeat of the revolution. As I will try to show, all these
can explain his particular emphasis on the question of organization
of a mass political intellectuality as a necessary condition of the
potential conquest of hegemony by the subaltern classes.
Gramsci’s thinking on questions of organization was also
conditioned by his own experiences of political militancy: his
participation in the formation of an independent communist party
oscillating between sectarianism – in the particular version
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represented by Bordiga – and the emerging line of the United
Front, which would also be the background of Gramsci’s last
interventions before his imprisonment; his experience and
participation in a unique experiment of autonomous class
organization, the worker’s councils, would be a constant reference
point as a case study of proletarian self-government; his first hand
experience of the Communist International in a period when there
was still open discussion and confrontation between different
opinions before the advent of a supposed “monolithic” functioning.
Of all these experiences it is important to stress the formative
character of Gramsci’s involvement in the factory council movement in Turin and in the publication of Ordine Nuovo (d’Orsi 2017,
pp. 98-131). The factory council movement presented for him an
example of an emerging workers’ democracy: “The socialist State
already exists potentially in the institutions of social life characteristic of the exploited working class” (Gramsci 1977, p. 65). At the
same time this experience made him confront the complex question
of the relation between spontaneous movements and organized
political forms, something evident in the tension in his writings at
that time regarding the roles of the party and the councils
(Silvestrini 2017).
The importance of the factory council / Ordine Nuovo experience
is also evident in Q3§48, a note written between October and
November 1930. The reference in the title of the note to spontaneity
and conscious leadership sets the tone of the note. For Gramsci “‘pure’
spontaneity does not exist in history” (Gramsci 1975, Q3§48, p.
328; PN Vol. 2, p. 48) and elements of conscious leadership are
always active in movements of the subaltern classes, “but none of
them predominates or goes beyond the level of ‘popular science’ –
‘common sense,’ that is the [traditional] conception of the world –
of a given social stratum” (Gramsci 1975, Q3§48, p. 328; PN Vol.
2, p. 49). Gramsci defends the Turin movement against accusations
that it was sponteneist or voluntarist and defends “the creativity
and soundness of the leadership that the movement acquired”. And
this is how Gramsci describes this creativity and soundness:
This was not an “abstract” leadership; it did not consist in the mechanical
repetition of scientific or theoretical formulas; it did not confuse politics – real
action – with theoretical disquisition. It devoted itself to real people in specific
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historical relations, with specific sentiments, ways of life, fragments of
worldviews, etc., that were outcomes of the “spontaneous” combinations of a
given environment of material production with the “fortuitous” gathering of
disparate social elements within that same environent. The element of
“spontaneity” was not neglected, much less disdained: it was educated, it was
given a direction, it was cleansed of everything extraneous that could
contaminate it, in order to unify it by means of modern theory but in a living
historical manner (Gramsci 1975, Q3§48, p. 330; PN Vol. 2, p. 50)

Gramsci here points to a complex conception of leadership as a
transformative process, where the “spontaneous” elements in the
resistances and aspirations of the subaltern classes are transformed
into a conscious political practice by means of a “pedagogical”
intervention that brings along theoretical elements not in order to
replace the spontaneous elements but to unify them. Consequently,
“[t]he unity of ‘spontaneity’ and ‘conscious leadership,’ or ‘discipline,’ is precisely the real political action of the subaltern classes”
(Gramsci 1975, 3§48, p. 330; PN Vol. 2, p. 51). This makes evident
that Gramsci not only always had a reference to the experience of
the factory councils movement, but also that his conception of
political “leadership” also included this articulation and reciprocal
relation between the “party form” and the collective practices and
ingenuity of the subaltern masses in struggle, especially when such
forms of self-organization emerged.
Lukács also dealt with the same question in his 1968 Process of
democratisation when he stressed that “seemingly overpowering mass
spontaneity was even expanded, consolidated and directed toward
concrete goals through the organizational work of the council
movement [Rätebewegung]. Originating in the Commune of 1871,
spontaneously cropping up anew in 1905, the council movement
became the paradigmatic model of socialist democracy in and after
1917” (Lukács 1991, p. 125; translation modified). However, it is
interesting that in this intervention, Lukács insisted on the
impossibility of repeating the experience of the councils and
stressed instead the role of the party in regard to the task of
democratizing socialism: “the present, extremely widespread apathy
of the laboring masses can only develop itself to such socialist
democratic activity through goals provided it by an outside force”.
For Lukács it was the Communist Party that should take up the task
“of mobilization, of taking the currently private, intersubjective, and
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subterranean movements and organizing them in practical life as
emancipator, as goal-oriented behavior” (Lukács 1991, p. 162).
Returning to Gramsci, in a note on Machiavelli, originally in
Notebook 8 and then in a second draft in Notebook 13, he encapsulates the necessity of the political party, in opposition to other
forms of organization exactly on the basis of a need not only to
form a collective will but also to enable it to articulate and execute a
political project. Here the opposition is to Sorel, who is accused by
Gramsci that, by remaining confined to the conception of the
“myth” (the ideological and political imagery that would inspire the
masses), he also remains within the limits of the trade union and the
general strike, without being able to think either the notion of the
party or a more general project of political transformation.
A study might be made of how it came about that Sorel never advanced
from his conception of ideology-as-myth to an understanding of the political
party, but stopped short at the idea of the trade union. It is true that for Sorel
the “myth” found its fullest expression not in the trade union as organisation
of a collective will, but in its practical action – sign of a collective will already
operative. The highest achievement of this practical action was to have been
the general strike – i.e. a “passive activity”, so to speak, of a negative and
preliminary kind (it could only be given a positive character by the realization
of a common accord between the various wills involved), an activity which
does not envisage an “active and constructive” phase of its own (Gramsci
1975, Q13§1, pp. 1556-57; SPN, p. 127).

It is upon this basis that Gramsci can suggest the analogy
between Machiavelli’s Prince, namely the way that the Florentine
thinker sought the person that could function as the catalyst for a
process of national unification of the fragmented Italian space, and
the modern political party. The aim was to suggest that the
communist party (but also the United Front) should also function
in this unifying way, articulating the fragmented and “molecular”
practices and aspirations of the subaltern in a common political
demand for radical transformation.
The modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete
individual. It can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which a
collective will, which has already been recognized and has to some extent
asserted itself in action, begins to take concrete form. History has already
provided this organism, and it is the political party – the first cell in which
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there come together germs of a collective will tending to become universal and
total (Gramsci 1975, Q13§1, p. 1558; SPN, p. 129).

This drawing of a line of demarcation from Sorel is also in fact
Gramsci’s way to transcend a politics of simply investing upon the
spontaneous political forms emerging in the class struggle.
However, transcending does not mean denying or rejecting. Rather
it means acknowledging limits and confronting the challenge of a
politics referring to political level per se. This can account for the
positive account of Jacobinism as a reference point for the Modern
Prince, with Jacobinism becoming a synonym for a politics aiming
at the formation of a collective will for hegemony.
The abstract character of the Sorelian conception of the myth is manifest in
its aversion (which takes the emotional form of an ethical repugnance) for the
Jacobins, who were certainly a “categorical embodiment” of Machiavelli's
Prince. The Modern Prince must have a part devoted to Jacobinism (in the
integral sense which this notion has had historically, and must have conceptually), as an exemplification of the concrete formation and operation of a
collective will which at least in some aspects was an original, ex novo creation.
And a definition must be given of collective will, and of political will in general,
in the modem sense: will as operative awareness of historical necessity, as
protagonist of a real and effective historical drama (Gramsci 1975, Q13§1, p.
1559; SPN, p. 130).

Consequently, for Gramsci the Modern Prince is a way to think
the political operation of the revolutionary party (and also the
United Front as the principal form of doing mass politics), treating
it as the terrain par excellence for the elaboration of a collective will
capable of being the protagonist of a process of social transformation. That is why the duties of the Modern Prince also include
another crucial Gramscian notion: “intellectual and moral reform”.
This notion points to the way in which Gramsci considers both
historical materialism and the communist perspective to refer to the
universal transformation of all instances of social existence.
The Modern Prince must be and cannot but be the proclaimer and
organiser of an intellectual and moral reform, which also means creating the
terrain for a subsequent development of the national-popular collective will
towards the realization of a superior, total form of modern civilization.
(Gramsci 1975, Q13§1, p. 1560; SPN, pp. 132-3).
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This is indeed a very important and very dense passage from
Gramsci, since it both incorporates and at the same time transcends
the “Jacobin” notion of the collective will, with the inclusion of a
defining aspect of subalternity in the notion of “national-popular”,
connecting it to the communist perspective (hence the reference to
a superior and total form of modern civilization) and insisting that
the terrain for the elaboration for such a political practice is indeed
the Modern Prince.
2.2. Mass intellectuality and common sense
What is also particularly important is how Gramsci has a fairly
broad conception of the intellectual aspect of all social practice:
There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual
participation can be excluded: Homo faber cannot be separated from homo
sapiens. [. . .] The problem of creating a new stratum of intellectuals consists
therefore in the critical elaboration of the intellectual activity that exists in
everyone … (Gramsci 1975, Q12§3, pp. 1550-51; SPN, p. 9).

This broad definition of intellectuality is a very crucial node in
Gramsci’s attempt to link the possibility of a subaltern hegemony
with the form of intellectuality inherent to the practices of the
subaltern classes. This need to find the elements of intellectuality
that exist in the practices of the subaltern in order to transform
them as part of a politics for hegemony, is also evident in his
approach to the notion of the common sense [senso comune].
Every social stratum has its own ‘common sense’ and its own ‘good sense’,
which are basically the most widespread conception of life and of man. Every
philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of ‘common sense’: this is
the document of its historical effectiveness. Common sense is not something
rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with
scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary
life. ‘Common sense’ is the folklore of philosophy, and is always half-way
between folklore properly speaking and the philosophy, science, and
economics of the specialists. Common sense creates the folklore of the future,
that is as a relatively rigid phase of popular knowledge at a given place and
time. (Gramsci 1975, Q24§4, p. 2271; SPN, p. 326, footnote 5).

What is important in this conception is that this is not just a
relation of transforming common sense into “good sense”, which
would suggest a traditional “pedagogical” conception of politics as
“political education”. One way to think these questions is by
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turning to Gramsci’s conception of hegemony as a pedagogical
practice and relation. This is exemplified in the following wellknown passage from Q10II§44):
This problem can and must be related to the modern way of considering
pedagogical doctrine and practice, according to which the relationship between
teacher and pupil is active and reciprocal so that every teacher is always a pupil
and every pupil a teacher. [...] This form of relationship exists throughout
society as a whole and for every individual relative to other individuals. It exists
between intellectual and non-intellectual sections of the population, between
the rulers and the ruled, elites and their followers, leaders [dirigenti] and led,
the vanguard and the body of the army. Every relationship of “hegemony” is
necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation,
between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental
civilisations (Gramsci 1975, Q10II§44, p. 1331; SPN, pp. 349-50).

Pedagogy in Gramsci has a specific signification and there is
always a dialogue with Marx’s third Thesis on Feuerbach, the thesis that
articulates a dialectical pedagogical relation based upon the premise
that the educator must also be educated with revolutionary praxis:
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is
essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide
society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or
self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary
praxis. (MECW, Vol. 5, p. 4, translation modified).7

2.3 From the integral state to the possibility of integral autonomy
Gramsci did not only offer an important contribution to the
theory of the State and hegemony. He also attempted an answer to
In the MECW revolutionäre Praxis is translated as revolutionary practice. I think that praxis is more
accurate, especially since praxis is a crucial notion of Gramsci. It is also interesting that when
Engels first included the “Theses on Feurebach” as an appendix to his Ludwig Feuerbach and the
End of Classical German Phiosophy, he made certain modifications to the text of Marx’s original
manuscript. One of these was to replace revolutionäre Praxis with umwälzende Praxis. Gramsci in
his own translation of the ‘Theses’ seems to use Engels’s version and to follow a tradition that
begins with Gentile and translates umwälzende Praxis as “rovesciamento della praxis” (Gramsci
2007, p. 744. See also the note of the editors (Giuseppe Cospito and Gianni Francioni) on pp
814-815).
7
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the question to “how does the State think”, which is also a contribution to any potential theory of organization. Of particular
importance is Gramsci’s conception of the “integral state” (Thomas
2009), which includes political society and civil society, public and
private hegemonic apparatuses, the aspect of coercion, of direction
/ leadership but also of consent.
[T]he State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with
which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but
manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules (Gramsci 1975,
Q15§10, p. 1765; SPN, p. 244).

Gramsci’s reference to practical and theoretical activities is very
important and it points towards a highly original relational and
practical conception of the State. It points towards a thinking of the
state neither as an instrument nor as a headquarters but as a terrain
where the dominant classes produce discourses, ideologies,
knowledges, strategies referring to their hegemonic practice.
However, there are differences between how the state thinks and
how the subaltern classes can think the possibility of their unity in
the struggle for emancipation. It is exactly here that the question of
organization emerges. The question is not whether the subaltern
classes can influence, directly or indirectly, social and political
relations of forces. Rather, the question is how to transform the
subaltern classes into an autonomous social force in order for the
question for a conquest of hegemony by the subaltern to be posed.
In the following passage Gramsci not only establishes the terms of
this challenge but also makes evident that the aim has to be
organizational forms that enable their autonomous political
constitution and mobilization:
The subaltern classes, by definition, are not unified and cannot unite until
they are able to become a “State”: their history, therefore, is intertwined with
that of civil society, it is a “dismembered” and discontinuous function of the history of
civil society [è una funzione «disgregata» e discontinua della storia della società
civile] and thereby of the history of States and groups of States. Hence it is
necessary to study: 1. the objective formation of the subaltern social groups, by
the developments and transformations occurring in the sphere of economic
production ; their quantitative diffusion and their origins in pre-existing social
groups, whose mentality, ideology and aims they conserve for a time; 2. their
active or passive affiliation to the dominant political formations, their attempts
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to influence the programmes of these formations in order to press claims of
their own, and the consequences of these attempts in determining processes of
decomposition, renovation or neo-formation; 3. the birth of new parties of the
dominant groups, intended to conserve the assent of the subaltern groups and
to maintain control over them; 4. The formations which the subaltern groups
themselves produce, in order to press claims of a limited and partial character ;
5. those new formations which assert the autonomy of the subaltern groups,
but within the old framework ; 6. those formations which assert the integral
autonomy, . . etc. (Gramsci 1975, Q25§5, p. 2288; SPN, p. 52. The italicized
line, inadvertently omitted from SPN, is here reinstated with the consequent
modification of a preposition that follows).

According to this approach, on the one hand we have the integral
state as the material terrain of bourgeois hegemony and on the other
hand the exigency for organizational forms that could enhance the
integral autonomy of the subaltern classes in their struggle for an
antagonistic form of hegemony. However, one point is very important. This seemingly apparent symmetry between Stato integrale and
autonomia integrale, should not be treated in a simplistic way. The State
and the organizational forms that enable this integral autonomy of the
subaltern classes are fundamentally different apparatuses. They represent antagonistic forms of organization and practice of politics.
2.4. The emergence of a new intellectuality
How can we think such an antagonistic form of political
intellectuality? Gramsci offers some important points. First, he
insisted that “everyone is a philosopher” (Gramsci 1975 Q11§12, p.
1375; SPN, p. 323), thus pointing to the element of intellectuality
inherent to any practice, as already discussed, but also the possibility of the emergence of mass forms of transformed intellectuality.
Moreover, he stressed that the most important aspect refers to the
transformation of the ways that people think when they think in a
“coherent” way namely when they strive for their autonomy.
For a mass of people to be led to think coherently and in the same coherent
fashion about the real present world, is a “philosophical” event far more
important and “original” than the discovery by some philosophical “genius” of
a truth which remains the property of small groups of intellectuals. (Gramsci
1975 Q11§12, p.1378; SPN, p. 325).
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Gramsci insists that “[t]he political party for some social groups
is nothing other than their specific way of elaborating their own
category of organic intellectuals directly in the political and philosophical field and not just in the field of productive technique”
(Gramsci 1975 Q12§1, p. 1522; SPN, p. 15). However, he makes it
clear that does not refer to some group or stratum of “specialists”
but to all the militants.
That all members of a political party should be regarded as intellectuals is an
affirmation that can easily lend itself to mockery and caricature. But if one
thinks about it nothing could be more exact. (Gramsci 1975, Q12§1, p. 1523;
SPN, p. 16).

In his struggling effort to think the mass formation of organic
intellectuals for proletarian hegemony as integral subaltern
autonomy, Gramsci insists that “[i]f the ‘new’ intellectuals put
themselves forward as the direct continuation of the previous
‘intelligentsia’, they are not new at all (that is, not tied to the new
social group which organically represents the new historical
situation) but are a conservative and fossilised left-over of the social
group which has been historically superseded”(Gramsci 1975,
Q11§16, p 1407; SPN, p. 453). These new intellectuals must be
formed within the struggle of the working class for autonomy, but
also within the practical effort for new forms of social organization
and production. The fact that their formation is not limited to the
traditional institutions associated with intellectual activity calls to
mind Foucault’s conception of the “specific intellectuals”
(Foucault, 2002: 126-133), although it should be noted that
Gramsci stresses the direct connection with revolutionary political
practice. This is evident in passages such as this:
On this basis the weekly O[rdine] N[uovo] worked to develop certain forms
of new intellectualism and to determine its new concepts, and this was not the
least of the reasons for its success, since such a conception corresponded to
latent aspirations and conformed to the development of the real forms of life.
The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence,
which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in
active participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, “permanent
persuader” and not just a simple orator (but superior at the same time to the
abstract mathematical spirit); from technique-as-work one proceeds to
technique-as-science and to the humanistic conception of history, without
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which one remains “specialised” and does not become “directive” (specialised
and political). (Gramsci 1975, Q12§3, p. 1551; SPN, pp. 9-10).

Another important element pointing to the same direction, is to
return to Gramsci’s conception of the philosophy of praxis as also a
form of mass critical intellectuality and as a different practice of
philosophy, There we can also find the figure of the “democratic
philosopher” which also points to new way to think this antagonistic form of political intellectuality.
One could say therefore that the historical personality of an individual
philosopher is also given by the active relationship which exists between him
and the cultural environment he is proposing to modify. The environment
reacts back on the philosopher and imposes on him a continual process of selfcriticism. It is his “teacher”. This is why one of the most important demands
that the modern intelligentsias have made in the political field has been that of
the so-called “freedom of thought and of the expression of thought”
(“freedom of the press”, “freedom of association”). For the relationship
between master and disciple in the general sense referred to above is only
realised where this political condition exists, and only then do we get the
“historical” realization of a new type of philosopher, whom we could call a
“democratic philosopher” in the sense that he is a philosopher convinced that
his personality is not limited to himself as a physical individual but is an active
social relationship of modification of the cultural environment. When the
“thinker” is content with his own thought, when he is “subjectively”, that is
abstractly, free, that is when he nowadays becomes a joke. The unity of science
and life is precisely an active unity, in which alone liberty of thought can be
realised; it is a master-pupil relationship, one between the philosopher and the
cultural environment in which he has to work and from which he can draw the
necessary problems for formulation and resolution. In other words, it is the
relationship between philosophy and history. (Gramsci 1975, Q10II§44 pp.
1331-32; SPN, p. 350).

This conception of an active social relation of transformation of
the cultural environment offers the starting point for a transformative practice of political intellectuality that goes beyond the
way suggested by Badiou. Here we are dealing with a process that
included what people do in the struggle for emancipation, how they
learn, think and change within struggle. This offers a much more
dialectical image that combine doing politics and thinking politics,
while at the same time being part of a movement that is
transforming social relations and forms and this way producing the
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intellectual elements and conditions that are necessary for such a
movement. One might say that Gramsci had in mind not only a
new quality of militancy but also a new form of mass intellectuality
as a condition for hegemony.
For Gramsci we can find here one of the main duties of
intellectuals: ‘the task of the intellectuals is to determine and to
organise moral and intellectual reform, in words to fit culture to the
sphere of practice (Gramsci 1975, Q11§16, p. 1407; SPN, p. 253).
In the first draft of this text in Notebook 8, instead of moral and
intellectual reform Gramsci writes “cultural revolution” (Gramsci
1975, Q8§171, p. 1044). As Fabio Frosini (Frosini 2003, p. 95-97)
and Peter Thomas (Thomas 2009, pp. 232-234) have stressed the
notion of the cultural revolution comes from the discussions of the
NEP period and “Lenin’s last battle” (Lewin 1968), when in the
thinking of Lenin there is a constant return of questions referring to
the need for a new civilization and the new mass intellectuality as an
answer to the contradictions of the transition process.
2.5. The party as laboratory
However, there are still open questions: how are these new mass
forms of militant intellectuality going to be produced, especially
when Gramsci was not simply suggesting copying the ways that the
bourgeoisie formed its hegemonic apparatuses and articulated its
hegemony? What form could the hegemonic apparatuses of a
potential hegemony of the subaltern have? It is here that the
conception of the political party as the terrain for new forms of
mass political intellectualities emerges:
One should stress the importance and significance which, in the modern
world, political parties have in the elaboration and diffusion of conceptions of
the world, because essentially what they do is to work out the ethics and the
politics corresponding to these conceptions and act as it were as their historical
“laboratory”. The parties recruit individuals out of the working mass, and the
selection is made on practical and theoretical criteria at the same time. The
relation between theory and practice becomes even closer the more the conception is vitally and radically innovatory and opposed to old ways of thinking.
For this reason one can say that the parties are the elaborators of new integral
and all-encompassing intellectualities and the crucibles where the unification of
theory and practice, understood as a real historical process, takes place
(Gramsci 1975, Q11§12, p. 1385; SPN, p. 335 translation modified).

27

International Gramsci Journal No. 10 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) Summer /Estate 2019

This is a very dense passage that offers a highly original
conception of the political organization that at the same times
offers both form and content to the question posed by Lukács
when he referred to the question of organization as an intellectual
question. The metaphor of the laboratory and the terrain of
experimentation are radically different from the metaphors
suggested for the party in the history of the working-class
movement. In particular, it is important to stress that they do not
point to imitating the State and its apparatuses. Gramsci presents
the party as neither imperium in imperio nor as the general staff of the
proletarian army. In contrast, he points towards the unification of
theory and practice, proposing a political process for the production of knowledges, strategies, tactics, and forms of intellectuality,
where the elements that come from the participation in struggles
(experience, sensitivities, encounters with other forms of knowledge and discourse, theories, collective experiments) can be
elaborated and transformed. It is this functioning of the party as a
laboratory of intellectuality that enables it to contribute to the
formation of a new historical bloc. It is only through such a process
that the particular version of representation and transformation
associated with a politics for communism.
If the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the
leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion
in which feeling-passion becomes understanding and thence knowledge (not
mechanically but in a way that is alive), then and only then is the relationship
one of representation. Only then can there take place an exchange of individual
elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders [dirigenti] and led, and can the
shared life be realised which alone is a social force with the creation of the
“historical bloc” (Gramsci 1975, Q11§67 pp. 1505-6; SPN, p. 418).

There are certain conditions for such a conception of the
political party. It is important to stress the distance between
Gramsci and a bureaucratic conception of centralization and his
opposition to the Stalinist version of the “party spirit”. The
following passage from Q9§68, written between July and August
1932 (and then included in Q13§36) refers exactly to this point:
The most accurate name would be bureaucratic centralism. “Organicity”
can only be found in democratic centralism, which is so to speak a
“centralism” in movement –i.e. a continual adaptation of the organization to
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the real movement, and is organic to the extent that it takes account of
movement which is the organic way that historical reality manifests itself
(Gramsci 1975, Q9§68, p. 1139; cf. the second draft in SPN, pp. 188-9).

Giuseppe Cospito (2016, pp. 169-184) has shown, by means of a
very detailed presentation of all the relevant passages from the
Notebooks, the displacements in the way that Gramsci deals with
bureaucratic, organic and democratic centralism. Initially Gramsci
opposes democratic centralism, which is presented as his own
choice, to both bureaucratic centralism (in essence the Stalinist
version of centralism) and organic centralism (which refers to
Bordiga’s conception of the party) thinking that they have similar
problematic aspects. However, at a later stage, expressed in passages such as the one quoted above, the main enemy is bureaucratic
centralism, namely the Stalinist conception of the party and democratic centralism is presents as the one that can also have the
necessary organic character. This implies that the democratic
functioning of the political organization is not only the guarantee to
avoid bureaucracy, but also the necessary condition to achieve an
“organic” character, namely close connection to the working class
and to the potential emergence in a concrete historical conjuncture.
Moreover, “organic” is an adjective that we often encounter in the
Notebooks and it always refers to close relation, historical depth, and
real adequation between politics and historical dynamics.
It is in this sense that for Gramsci one of the gravest dangers
that a party faces is to become an anachronism. And although the
following passage comes from a note referring to the broader issue
of the role of political parties in a period of organic crisis, it is
interesting how it can also refer to the political organizations of the
working class:
This order of phenomena is connected to one of the most important
questions concerning the political party – i.e. the party’s capacity to react
against force of habit, against the tendency to become mummified and
anachronistic. Parties come into existence, and constitute themselves as
organisations, in order to influence the situation at moments which are
historically vital for their class; but they are not always capable of adapting
themselves to new tasks and to new epochs, nor of evolving pari passu with the
overall relations of force (and hence the relative position of their class) in the
country in question, or in the international field. In analysing the development
of parties, it is necessary to distinguish: their social group; their mass member-
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ship; their bureaucracy and General Staff. The bureaucracy is the most
dangerously hidebound and conservative force; if it ends up by constituting a
compact body, which stands on its own and feels itself independent of the
mass of members, the party ends up by becoming anachronist and at moments
of acute crisis it is voided of its social content and left as though suspended in
mid-air. (Gramsci 1975, Q13§23, p. 1604; SPN, p. 211).

Gramsci’s distancing from Stalinist practices in regard to the
internal fighting inside the party was evident in various moments.
In the famous letter of 1926 on behalf of the Italian Party, in which
they asked the leadership of the Soviet Party to not jeopardize the
unity of the international communist movement, in his refusal
inside the prison to endorse the denunciations of the “Opposition”,
despite his criticism of Trotsky and Bukharin, his critique of
“statolatry” (Gramsci 1975, Q8§130, pp. 1020-21; PN Vol. 3, pp.
310-11), but also his dense critique of the evolution of the Stalinism
in notes 74 and 76 of Notebook 14 (SPN pp. 254-7), written in
March 1935 (notes that at the same time offer an insightful analysis
of fascism).8
In contrast, Gramsci’s conception of democratic centralism
points towards a conception of the party as an open political and
intellectual process, constantly adapting itself to the surrounding
social environment and the dynamics of the conjuncture. It is very
important that Gramsci insists that this process is experimental in
nature, it is an experimental practice. The very notion of the
experiment expands the notion of the laboratory towards an
experimental conception of politics. The following passage from
Q9§68 exemplifies this position:
In parties representing socially subaltern groups, the element of stability
represents the organic need to ensure that hegemony does not belong to
privileged groups, but to the progressive forces, those organically progressive
with respect to other forces that are allied but composed of and oscillating
between the old and the new. In any event, what is important to note is that in
the manifestations of bureaucratic centralism the situation evolves due to the
lack of initiative; that is, due to the political primitiveness of the peripheral
forces, even when these are homogeneous with the hegemonic territorial
group. Especially with international territorial organisms, the emergence of
such situations is extremely harmful and dangerous. Democratic centralism is
an elastic formula that lends itself to many ‘incarnations’; it exists because it is
8

See the reading of these passages in Cospito 2016.
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continually interpreted and continually adapted to necessity, and it consists in
the critical search for that which is equal in the apparent dissimilarity and
distinct and opposite in the apparent uniformity, and in organizing and closely
connecting that which is similar, but in a way that this organization and
connection should appear as an ‘inductive’, experimental practical necessity
and not the result of a rationalistic, deductive, abstract procedure that is,
produced by ‘pure’ intellectuals. This continual effort to distinguish between
the ‘international’ and ‘unitary’ in the national and local reality represents, in
reality, the concrete political operation, the merely productive activity of
historical progress. This effort requires an organic unity between theory and
practice, between intellectual strata and the masses, between governors and
governed. The formulae of unity and federation lose much of their meaning
from this point of view; they instead produce their poison in the ‘bureaucratic’
conception, according to which in reality unity does not exist, only superficially
calm and ‘mute’ stagnant swamps; neither does federation exist, only sacks of
potatoes; that is, the mechanical juxtaposition of individual ‘units’ without any
interrelationship (Gramsci 1975, Q9§68, pp. 1139-40).9

3. The question of organization today
I think that in Gramsci we can find a much more dialectical
approach to the question posed by Lazarus and Badiou regarding a
form of thinking of politics in interiority to a potentially revolutionary sequence but also with an answer to the questions posed by
Lukács. If we are talking about organizations that refer to a
communist horizon, the question is much broader than simply
avoiding bureaucratic sclerosis. Such organizations must also be a
permanent learning process, production sites of thinking. This is
suggested by the analogy to the laboratory. This points towards
spaces where people coming from the movements come in order
not only to be politicized, something that in the tradition of the
Left was considered as synonymous with ideological indoctrination,
but to contribute with their own voice, but also in their own voice,
and experience to the complex process of elaboration of alternatives, while at the same time constantly struggling against the disaggregating effects of bourgeois ideology and politics. It also points
towards the formation of antagonistic forms of theory and
knowledge production, beyond and outside traditional academic
frameworks, an approach that can be found in the history of the
labour movement from Marx’s enquête ouvrière to the idea of coresearch in workerism / operaismo (Lanzardo 1965; Alquati 1975;
9

We use the translation of this passage in Cospito 2016, pp. 77-78.
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Alquati 1993; Panzieri 1976; Wright 2002), to other experiments
with alternative forms and practices of knowledge production. The
analogy with the laboratory also includes an experimental approach,
which is exactly the “gnoseological” aspect of any politics of
transformation, since it points towards learning by struggles but
also from the collective experimentation and ingenuity of the
subaltern.
Such a conception of the organization, the party or the front as a
laboratory and open learning process, enables us to think the
hegemonic aspect of politics along with the element of encounter
and articulation of movements, demands and political strategies
beyond the limits of any claim to horizontality, a notion that cannot
account for the element of transformation and potential
unifications of resistances into a common hegemonic project, a
path of collective experimentation towards communism. At the
same time, it avoids the logic of imposing an imaginary unity or an
almost metaphysical conception of the ‘political line, insisting on
the open and necessarily but also creatively contradictory and
transformative character of the process. Alan Sears has recently
stressed this aspect:
A truly effective anti-capitalism requires a deep commitment to learning
from every situation which requires both open-endedness and fundamental
orientating principles. The resources of anti-capitalism cannot consist of the
shards of the last infrastructure of dissent preserved as holy relics and passed
on as “truth”. The current marginal anti-capitalist left is too often grounded in
a faith-based politics, founded on a worshipful approach to the experience of
twentieth-century socialism or anarchism. The next new left needs to work creatively and open-endedly together to identify emergent trends and develop new
politics that fits the times and is informed by past struggles (Sears 2014, p. 111).

This need to restore the voice to the masses as part of the attempt
towards a refoundation of the politics of emancipation was also
stressed by Althusser in the 1970s. In one of his confrontations
with the open crisis of the French Communist Party, which was not
only strategic but also had to do with the prevailing organizational
culture, Althusser insisted upon the importance of
restoring their voice to the masses who make history. Not just putting oneself ‘at
the service of the masses’ (a slogan which may be pretty reactionary), but opening one’s ears to them, studying and understanding their aspirations and their con-
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tradictions, their aspirations in their contradictions, learning how to be attentive to the masses’ imagination and inventiveness.(Althusser 1977, p. 11).

This call by Althusser, which was part of his broader self-critical
acknowledgement of the crisis of the communist movement, can of
course be linked to Badiou’s insistence that people think that we
have already discussed, they think in their aspirations and contradictions and their imagination and inventiveness. Yet this requires
the terrain for this voice and this thinking to be heard. It is here
that Gramsci’s “Modern Prince” enters the stage and sets the terms
of the debate. The party as laboratory represents this possibility.
This also gives a new meaning to the need for new forms of
democracy and participation, new democratic forms of militancy. It
is at the same time an attempt to create political spaces the offer a
better “sociality” than the everyday confrontation with rigid hierarchies, exploitation, oppression and sexism and an attempt to
enable this collective “restoring the voice”, this opening to the
lessons coming from the struggles and the movements and the
experiments with alternative social configurations, along with new
forms of radical theory and new forms of militant research.
I think that all these questions are today more pertinent than
ever.10 The varieties of radicalism emerging after 2011 have confronted the question of organization in different and contradictory
ways. The new forms of democracy and equal voicing in sometimes
led to an underestimation of the question of organization of a new
type, a question lost in the debates regarding horizontality and
intersectionality. Traditional forms of “Leninist” organizing, at least
in Western Europe and the US also went through a period of crisis,
since the mentality of the “small group” cannot stand up to the
challenge offered by mass movements of a different magnitude.
Broad Fronts, especially those organized by means of forms of
mass digital participation also showed their limits not only in
strategic political terms (in the sense of an inability to work towards
the formation of a new historical bloc) but also in the absence of
any actual interaction between leadership and base. Putting aside
the question of organization, as in a certain manner Badiou has

On the importance of Gramsci’s consideration for the organization question today see also
Thomas 2013.
10
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suggested, in the name of the danger of all “party politics” turning
into parliamentary “State politics”, is not an answer.
In the sense exactly as the integral State was defined by Gramsci
as the “entire complex of practical and theoretical activities”
(Gramsci 1975, Q15§10 p. 1765, SPN p. 244) that ensure the
hegemony of the bourgeoisie, the Modern Prince can only be
understood as the entire complex of the theoretical and practical
activities that emerge out of the subaltern classes in their struggle
for integral autonomy and hegemony. It is on the basis of this
analogy that we can say that today the Modern Prince can only take
the form of an integral united front.
Consequently, the question does not simply refer to the
democratic character of organizations and fronts. In the same way
that the integral state represents the unity of political society and
civil society, in all their complexity and contradictory character, the
integral united front represents the contradictory and tendential
unity of political organizations and movements (against exploitation
and precariousness, oppression, racism, neo-colonialism, patriarchy
and heteronormativity). It is the reason that we cannot think of the
party as an apparatus, even a complex one. We are referring to
plurality of processes, practices, resistances and collectivities. Their
potential unification requires thinking the party or the organization
as a laboratory producing intellectualities, strategies, tactics, but also
as a hegemonic practice. It is a constant encounter between practices,
experiences and knowledges.
“Building the party” today – which in the contemporary historical period of fragmentation of the forces, militants and experiences
that oppose capitalism, points towards the creation of united fronts
rather than single parties – means transforming the terrain, forming
networks, spaces and new public spheres along with new militant
practices and a renewed conception of political discipline in a communist horizon above and beyond any ritualistic and mechanistic
conception of political discipline. Moreover, this should be combined with new and original forms of struggle, of resistance, blockage, reappropriation and emancipation. In this sense it is not about
a simple recruiting campaign but about a “permanent constituent
process”, combined with the autonomy of the forms of self-organization and counter-power of the subaltern. The very fact that today
the terrain of rethinking the very notion of the Modern Prince in-
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cludes parties, organizations, movements, and networks points to
the uneven and complex charecter of the process but at the same
time offers a way to actually think the potential of such a process.
In this sense, we can return to the comparison that Negri makes
and for whom the party should be a factory of strategies and an
enterprise of subversion. Taking into consideration the changes that
have taken places in the very form of the factory and the fact that
capitalist production today is organized in a much more fluid way,
more dispersed, more fragmented, at the same time that new, original and more complex forms of coordination are used, we can say
that also the form of the party and the front need to change, while
remaining loyal to their essential role: to produce strategies and
subversive practices, to form a terrain in order for the movements
that are at the heart of social antagonism to be transformed in all
their multiplicity to hegemonic projects for communism. This also
entails rethinking the forms of international coordination and a new
international, in order to go beyond the quest for an “international
revolutionary centre”, in order for an international public sphere to
emerge, based upon a new anti-imperialism, in order to rethink and
elaborate new strategies based upon local experiments. The entire
history of the revolutionary tendencies of the working class
movements is also the history of international debates, with the
most fruitful of them being those where the emphasis was upon
treating local experiences as experimental sites instead of looking
for the “fidelity” to the line of some revolutionary centre.
Rethinking critically and in a practical manner the question of
organization today means rethinking the possibility of a democratic
laboratory for new forms of collective militant intellectuality, for
the production of organic intellectuals of a new type and militant
“democratic philosophers”, in order to put in practice the idea that
“all members are intellectuals” and “everyone is a democratic
philosopher”.
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